Kim Jong Il Recovers his Health, Regime Stabilizes

In this photo distributed on Friday August 3, 2007, by the (North) Korean Central News Agency via Korea News Service in Tokyo, shown is North Korean leader Kim Jong Il, front right, inspecting a vegetable greenhouse during his visit to Combined Unit 264 of the Korean People's Army. The date and place of his visit were not disclosed by the sources. (AP Photo/Korea Central News Agency via Korea News Service)


Kim Jong Il Recovers his Health, Regime Stabilizes

Research on the Political Situation on Unification - North Korea Tries to Divide South Korean Politi
By Yang Jung A
dailynk.com
[2007-08-02 17:43 ]
With the protocol to stabilize the internal regime that North Korea has pursued for the first half of the year, speculations arise that they will carry on with a bolder policy both within and outside the government for the latter half of the year.
Lee Bong Jo, Head of the Korea Institute for National Unification claimed in the "Analysis of the North Korean Political Situation in the First Half of the Year" that he released through his website on the 27th that "North Korea will stifle the overly festive mood that is widespread that may hurt societal unity both within and outside the government. Through individuals in central political and military institutions, it seems that North Korea has tried meticulously to normalize national institutions in efforts to stabilize the regime.
Accordingly, he predicted, "There is a possibility that North Korea will pursue a further bolder policy both within and outside the government following the conclusion of the efforts to stabilize the internal regime and the recovery of Kim Jong Il's health in the latter half of the year."
The report added that "Internally, efforts will be focused to bring about technology and resources with regards to arbitrary expenses for enterprises and factories as well as strengthening of the efforts to involve the general public to solve economic issues. Externally, it is assumed that diplomatic efforts such as the expansion of dialogue between North Korea and the U.S. to settle economic compensation issues and the inducing of a North Korea - U.S. conference to solve the issue of military issues on the peninsula will be strengthened to change the North Korea - U.S. relationship.
In the analysis of the political category of the first half of the year, it evaluated that, "North Korea has carried on with its Great Four political festivities such as the 65th birthday of Kim Jong Il, 95th birthday of Kim Il Sung, 75th anniversary of the establishment of the army and the Arirang Commemoration without any other obstacles and showed off their continuance of political stability and Kim Jong Il's grasp over his power."
However it also analyzed, "Unexpectedly, the Great Four festivities did not surpass the scale of an ordinary festival and some parts of the festival were concluded earlier as the schedules were moved up. When considering the importance of a "Year that was Snapped Down", this may be reflecting the problems on a internal regime level."
In addition, it pointed out, "The frequency of Chairman Kim's public activity during the first half of the year has fallen to half [compared to last year]. Such low public activity reflects the personal problems [health issues] of Kim Jong Il or the direct signs of the internal regime."
The report goes on to state that during the first half of the year, it is "judged that North Korea has replaced several leading officials and pursued a stabilization of the structure of internal political power. The current individuals carry a distinct trait of being replaced in practical affairs (Prime Minister, external affairs) or strengthening and consolidating the central power institutions such as the National Defense Commission, Military Chief of Staff, General Political Bureau and the team managing the overall political propaganda."
"Latter Half of the Year, North Korea May Attempt a Political Disruption of the South"
Regarding the economic sphere, it has been evaluated that "North Korean authorities have spent effort to solve energy issues such as the previous economic decisions on electricity and coal. They have further tried to improve equipment to raise the effectiveness of the opening and development of the 4th Taecheon Power Plant and the 1st Uhrangcheon Power Plant."
Regarding the policy toward South Korea, "North Korea has showed its active involvement for the start of various North-South Conferences to gain actual benefits (such as economic benefits) and shows that it is actively using humanitarian conferences as a means to gain benefits as well. Especially regarding the case of the North-South Military Conference, instead of pursuing a conference to build credibility of North-South forces, it has gone in the direction of achieving political goals such as making the NLL problem into an issue."
The report also claims, "North Korea has officially started political involvement in South Korea and strengthened "National Cooperation" politics to take a half step in the consolidation of a pro-North Korean force and the fight against the U.S. in the first half of the year. They have genuinely tried to move strategically in their involvement with South Korean politics as they try to take the essence of the South Korean presidential election and to change it to a power struggle between "Pro-North Korean peace parties and Anti-North Korean militant parties".
Regarding the South Korean presidential elections, "North Korea's involvement can be broadly divided into the invitation of pan-ruling party candidates to North Korea and the anti-Grand National Party (GNP) propaganda activity. At first it started to generalize GNP as an anti-North Korean militant party and criticized them but it has moved on and spread to criticize the individual GNP’s candidates that seem favorable in the presidential election.
Moreover, it predicted that in the latter half of the year, "If North Korea feels the necessity, there is possibility that it will attempt political or societal division within South Korea through a series of activity to heighten anxiety or creating a division between the "militant party versus the peace party" within South Korea.